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Atrocities in East Timor 
Resistance Council co1npiles report 
The violation of human rights in East Timar is the subject of a 
detailed report compiled by the Revolutionary Council of Na-
tional Resistance (CRRN) in July 1983. The document has an in-
troduction by Kay Raia Xanana Gusmao , chairman of the Coun-
cil , in which he says that thick volumes would need to be written 
and endless lists drawn up to show the extent to which the In-
donesian forces of occupation totally ignore internationally-ac-
cepted principles of human rights. The conditions of war make it 
impossible, he points out, to investigate each and every case of 
murder or atrocity; furthermore, the climate of terror in the con-
centration camps makes the task of investigation extremely dif-
ficult . 
For these reasons, the information included in the document 
is limited in character, and is confined to cases where it has been 
possible to carry out an investigation and where the victims can 
be identified. The vast majority of cases involving masses of 
people cannot be recorded, only a small minority of cases involv-
ing Fretilin leaders whose fate it has been easier to record. An 
attempt has been made, in compiling the document, to distin-
guish periods and circumstances under which violations have oc-
curred: the period when people were still in their own towns or 
villages just after the invasion, the period when many people sur-
rendered voluntarily to the enemy (1976 to 1978), the period 
when people surrendered in response to 'amnesties' offered at 
the time of various military campaigns, and the capture of resis-
tance fighters by the forces of occupation. Xanana stressed the 
completely false nature of Indonesia's annual 'amnesties' which 
have proven to oe no protection against killings and disappear-
ances. 
Xanana lists the types of violations perpetrated as follows: 
1. Systematic persecution for the purpose of intimidation: threats, 
surveillance, provocation, restrictions on the freedom of movement , 
orders requiring people to report regularly to the authorities, night 
patrols of people's homes by armed troops, spreading rumours, utilis-
ing false statements and so on. These are daily occurrences, happen-
ing everywhere in the country. 
2. The torture of people suspected of taking part in clandestine or-
ganisations. Even the act of talking to an Indonesian soldier with 
folded arms (regarded as a political stance) or refusing to hand over 
something demanded by a soldier (which is taken as meaning that the 
person still harbours pro-Fretilin ideas) can be the pretext for regard-
ing someone as a suspect. Forms of torture include: shooting people, 
slapping them in the face , whipping them or beating them with a rifle 
butt, karate , cutting off an ear, punching people or burning them 
with lighted cigarettes, stabbing or lacerating the flesh, electric shock 
and other forms of physical mutilation. 
3. The prisons, which were formerly concentrated in the district 
towns, were always filled to overflowing, but more recently, prison-
ers have been transferred to Atauro island and other places of deten-
tion , including some nearby Indonesian islands. And recently too 
some prisoners have been conceafed in administrative posts after hav-
ing been interrogated and severely tortured by Kodim officers . 
Another form of deception is releasing prisoners on condition that 
the person goes into the bush and brings back the head of a resistance 
fighter. The 'released' detainee is given 7 to 14 days to do this, and if 
he fails he is sent to Atauro or made to 'disappear'. Sometimes a pris-
oner is 'released' on condition that he works for Indonesian intelli-
gence by returning to his former resistance group to gather informa-
tion about Fretilin or to betray members of the group. (Many people 
have been captured as a result of this kind of thing.) People who 
serve the enemy in this way are paid money, thus giving them a sense 
of obligation to their paymasters. 
4. People are murdered in a variety of ways: shot down in cold 
blood, beaten to death with rifles, shot by firing squad, burnt alive, 
buried alive, starved to death or dropped into the sea from a helicop-
ter. Women die after being savagely raped by a whole company of 
soldiers. There are also cases of people being poisoned by means of 
injection; as a result, many Timorese refuse medical treatment be-
cause they know of people who died within hours of being injected. 
As a result of persistent condemnation by international organisa-
tions, massacres and killings were replaced by the method of disap-
pearances, with the aim of intimidating the population; there have 
been countless cases of people disappearing from camps located in 
the interior. 
Xanana then points out that in view of the difficulties men-
tioned abo·ve, the cases recorded in the document are confined 
to those where the victim can be easily identified. In many cases, 
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it has not been possible to provide information because the wit-
nesses were themselves killed or have been placed under close 
surveillance. 
The cases reported in the first part of the CRRN document 
are as follows : 
A . Former members of the Fretilin Central Committee 
Anibal de Araujo and Leopoldo Hera/do Joaquim both surren-
dered to the enemy in 1977. By the beginning of 1979, they were 
considered to have disappeared. 
Joao Silvestre Branco, surrendered in the middle of 1977. He was 
killed at the end of 1979 together with a group of forty people . 
Joao Bosco Soares and Sebastiao Montaliao, part of the 'Skylight 
Operation' (a group within Fretilin that favoured integration), 
both disappeared a few months after they surrendered.1> 
B. Members of the Fretilin CC who were taken prisoner during 
the 1978 campaign 
Hata Vias Timur was burnt alive with petroleum after being tor-
tured. 
Mau Lear (Antonio Duarte Cervarino) was also burnt alive with 
petroleum after being tortured. 
Bi Lear (Maria do Leu Pereira) gave herself up in March 1979 in 
Venilale, and disappeared some days after arriving in Baucau 
where she was picked up by Colonel (then Major) Iswanto. 
Ma.u Sobu (l~acio da Fonseca), taken prisoner in the vicinity of 
Bmlo, Ossu m December 1978, was brutally beaten to death in 
Luka Dala, not far from Queliquai. 
Oscar Leopoldino de Araujo, arrested in March 1979 in the 
region of Barik~, was ta~en to Viqueque where he disappeared. 
Juvenal de Fatzma Inaczo, captured in the region of Bibileu in 
March 1979, was first taken to Dili then transferred to Baucau 
(for reasons that are not clear) . Then, while being taken to Dili 
by helicopter, he was dumped in the sea. 
pomingo. Rib~i:o, arrested at the end of 1978 in the Central Reg-
10n, was m Dih for a while, then disappeared in May 1979. 
Venancio Gomes da Silva was arrested at the time of the inva-
sion, then conditionally released, but in July 1980 he was knifed 
to death. 
C. Non members of the Fretilin CC 
Lino da Costa, commander of the sector of the Eastern Point 
was arrested in the region of Builo, Ossu at the end of 1978, and 
_was murdered in Luka Dala, Queliquai in 1980. 
Joao Baptista, commander of the Southern Border Sector, sur-
rendered at the end of 1977 and then disappeared. 
Amadeu Araujo Santos, commander of the North-Central Sec-
tor, one of the 'Skylight' group, disappeared in Dili. 
Afonso Moniz, commander of a shock-brigade, was arrested at 
the end of 1978, then disappeared from Comarca Prison Dili 
after being tortured following the June 1980 operation lau~cherl 
by Fretilin in Dili (an attack on the Indonesian television trans-
mitter) . 
"These cases provide concrete proof of what the successive, an-
nual 'amnes~ies' offered ~y Jak:irta have really meant. Nanga/a2J 
troops (soldiers armed with kmves) especially those in Battalion 
745, constantly assisted and encouraged by Lieutenant-Colonel 
Iswanto, are the butchers responsible for the most sadistic 
crimes. Such butchery exists at all levels of the occupation 
forces, from the Koramil officers and police down to the lowest 
village level; it exists among the hansip and ratih commanders, 
and among the civilian officials in posts such as the DPR and 
subdistrict heads. This systematic butchery proceeds under the 
constant supervision of the Kasi Satu {Section Head/Intelligence 
officer) in each of the regional capitals (district military com-
mands). 
"In East Timor, annual promotion for Indonesian officers is 
determined by the degree of crime they commit and the 
techniques of torture they apply,. There are Koram11 omcas 
who were promoted from sergeant-major to sub-lieutenant for 
such reasons. 3> There is the case of Major Wilhem da Costa, the 
intelligence officer who was only a sub-lieutenant in 1979 and 
achieved such rapid promotion because of the crimes he commit-
ted during the period of surrenders in 1978 and 1979 in the reg-
ion of Same. There is the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Iswanto 
who started off only as a sub-lieutenant in 19794• There are cases 
of Kodim officers who arrived in East Timor with the rank of 
captain or major and returned home with the rank of lieutenant-
colonel. They themselves publicly declare it was this system that 
made it so easy for them to obtain promotion." 
Footnotes: 
1. 'Skylight' was an intelligence operation to penetrate Fretilin 
leadership ranks and provoke defections. The leading defector 
was Alarico Fernandes who surrendered in September 1978, tak-
ing many others with him. Of all those who surrendered under 
the Skylight Operation, Fernandes is the only one known to have 
survived. He is now a prisoner on Sumba island. 
2. Nangala (probably nanggala) is frequently used in CRRN 
documents as the name for .Indonesian troops responsible for kil-
lings. The secret Army documents (see Supplement to TAPOL 
Bulletin No. 58, July 1983) also use the term, though without 
explanation. This term has not been previously encountered in 
Indonesian Army terminology. The only word which may pro-
vide a hint as to its origin is manggala which is the Sanskrit name 
for a disc-shaped, sharply-perforated weapon used by the Pan-
dawa brothers in the Mahabarata epic. The Pandawas were men 
of noble intentions, part of the Javanese pantheon of heroes. 
The Army often borrows from such sources to give its murderous 
activities the gloss of tradition. Help from readers regarding this 
term would be appreciated. 
3. Promotion from sergeant-major, the top NCO rank, to com-
missioned officer rank is generally speaking unheard of, except 
at times of retirement. 
4. Such rapid promotion in four years would mean rising no 
fewer than five ranks: to second-lieutenant, first lieutenant, cap-
tain, major, then lieutenant-colonel. 
Cases from the CRRN report 
In 1979, Alberto who was deputy-secretary of the Fretilin 
zone of Maubisse gave himself up in Hatubuiliku. He was 
brutally beaten up by military personnel, then sent to the 
town of Maubisse. On the way, the soldiers who were es-
corting him continually burnt his body with lit cigarettes. 
At the Maubisse Koramil, the officer in charge did nothing 
to protect him from such violence. On the contrary, the 
maltreatment continued after which he was driven to the 
town cemetery and shot with an MU-2. Not yet dead, Al-
berto shouted: "You may kill me but other comrades will 
continue the struggle." This infuritated the Ko ram ii officer 
who then ordered hansip troops to cut him up. Even while 
there were still signs of life, Alberto was burnt. 
On 24 August 1982, a guerilla also named Alberto was cap-
tured ~~ Indonesian troops in Dare region, Bohaha-
Hatubmhku. He was taken to the Dare concentration 
c~mp where the Koramil officer ordered his troops to kill 
him. W~en he was dead, the officer ordered his body to be 
cut up, hke the carcases of animals are cut up by butchers. 
The Korar:nil officer ate the fl~sh from Alberto's body for a 
week, telling people as he did so: "This is what we do to 
Fretilin people." The inhabitants at the Dare concentra-
tion camp are the witnesses of this barbaric crime. 
Francisco Barros, deputy-secretary of the Fretilin Zone 
and_ Antonio Adakay, a health officer, were captured i~ 
Banke, Cassoha~ on 3 September 1978. They were taken 
to Lakluta and tied to trees with their legs apart and their 
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From the CRRN report (continued) 
arms outstretched. They were burnt with lit cigarettes, 
then with red-hot irons . Then their penises were cut off 
and they were left to die in the sun. 
On a Friday night in September 1979, two companies of 
Indonesian troops from Quelique arrived in Laleia , and 
camped for the night on the Vemasse bank of the river 
Laleia. The soldiers asked their Timorese carriers to go 
and find two women. Two women were brought to them: 
Melinda da Costa and Ana Vicente da Costa. They were 
brutally violated by all the soldiers throughout the night . 
By morning, the women who were both in very bad shape 
tried to escape , but they were caught . The raping was re-
sumed till 12 noon that day. All this occurred by the road-
side; people going along the road to market in Laleia could 
see what was going on. 
Felicidado dois Santos Gandera, from Liquica (Ossu) , had 
studied at the Medical Faculty in Lisbon. She was a 
member of the Commissariat of the support base in the 
Ponta Leste Sector (Los Palos region) until its destruction 
by Indonesian troops in November 1978. She was arrested 
together with her husband Victor after the destruction of 
the base. Her husband was killed and dumped in the river 
Lura, at Txino. She was then dragged away by about half a 
dozen soldiers to the village of Lausepo, and violently 
raped . She was then shot dead with an UZI machine-gun . 
Mariano de Sousa, Clementina Joes Branco Ximenes, Joao 
de Brito Ximenes, all of them platoon commanders; Gre-
gorio Soares, Antonio Rufino de Costa, both section com-
manders; Felisberto Viegas, deputy-secretary of the Zone; 
Joao Viegas, in charge of the OPJT of the Zone; Sebastiao 
Gusmau, secretary of the suco*; Mario Ximenes, in charge 
of a village; the fighters Domingos Barto Ximenes, Sergio 
da Costa Gusmao, Felipe da Costa, Filomena Gusmao, 
Jose Bento, Jose Von and others, all surrendered and were 
taken prisoner in January 1979. After being tortured , they 
were released . Two weeks later , they were summoned to 
report and ordered to join hansip . After a week 's training, 
they were summoned for "night training" on 11 February 
1979. The whole group was shot dead by soldiers of Battal-
ion 745 . Domingos Mau-Ximenes whose name was also on 
the list of people to be shot had heard about the planned 
shooting, so he managed to survive. He and other inhabit-
ants are witnesses of this crime. (The precise location of 
this incident is not mentioned, but it comes under the sec-
tion headed Laleia .) 
Miguel Montiero, a native of Mehara/Tutuala, Los Palos, 
was commander of the Tutuala Zone . He was captured in 
1977 and held, then released. In 1979, he was captured 
again by Battalion 745 because he had taken part in clan-
destine activities of the armed resistance. After several 
days in captivity he was taken to a Battalion post at the 
former Catholic mission in Fuiloro where he was tortured 
and then killed. One of the Indonesian commanders of the 
Battalion ordered his chest to be cut open and his heart to 
be taken out . The soldiers were told to grill the heart and 
serve it up for him to eat. The commander then ate the 
heart with relish, making sure that the people from the 
surroundings were gathered there to watch this spectacle. 
After finishing this barbaric meal, he told the crowd who 
were standing around that whenever a Fretilin member 
was captured the same thing should be done because, he 
said, human flesh is very tasty, especially when it's the 
flesh of a member of Fretilin . 
*suco: a group of villages according to Timorese adminis-
trative practice 
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MPs call for arms embargo against 
Indonesia 
An Early Day Motion calling for an arms embargo against In-
donesia because of its renewed military operations in East Timor 
obtained the support of 118 Members of ParJiament in the first 
few days after it was tabled in the House of Commons. The Mo-
tion reads as follows: 
Red Cross had to suspend its much-needed food relief operations in 
East Timor a month before the offensive began because the Indone-
sian authorities had withdrawn the necessary facilities, calls upon Her 
Majesty's Government to halt the sale of arms and military equip-
ment to Indonesia and to take other urgent steps to press Indonesia 
to halt military operations. 
That this House, concerned at the new military offensive launched in 
August by Indonesia in East Timor which has been under illegal In-
donesian occupation since 1975 , and distressed that the International 
The signatories were still coming in as we went to press. They in-
clude MPs from the Labour Party, the Liberal-Party, the Conser-
vative Party and Plaid Cymru (Welsh Nationalists). 
Mr Robert Parry Miss Betty Boothroyd Mr Ian Mikardo Ms Harriet Harman Mr Laurie Pavitt 
Mr Paddy Ashdown Mr Dennis Canavan Mr GreviHe Janner Mr Tony Lloyd Mr John Evans 
Mr Alfred Dubs Mr Robert Wareing Mr Eric S. Heffer Mr James Tinn Mr Barry Jones 
Mr Ron Davies Mr Harry Gourlay Mr Ken Eastham Mr Peter Pike Mr Don Dixon 
Mr Allan Rogers Mr Michael Martin Mr Doug Hoyle Mr Bill Michie Mr Jam es Lamond 
Mr Frank Cook Mr Ted Leadbitter Mr Harry Cowans Mr Geoffrey Lofthouse Mr Ray Ellis 
Mr Eddie Loyden Mr Mark Fisher Mr Chris Smith Mr David Knox Mr Denzil Davies 
Mr Sydney Bidwell Mr James White Mr Martin J . O'Neill Mr Dafydd Wigley Mr Allen McKay 
Mr Robert Kilroy-Silk Mr Gerald Bermingham Mrs M. Beckett Mr Ron Leighton Mr Michael McGuire 
Mr Ernie Ross Mr John McWilliam Mr Kevin McNamara Mr Michael Welsh Mr William O'Brien 
Mr Allan Roberts Mr Terry Fields Jo Richardson Mr Tom Tomey Mr David Alton 
Mr Bob Litherland Mr Hugh McCartney Mr Kevin Barrow Mr Dafydd Thomas Mr Frank Field 
Mr Ian Campbell Mr Bob McTaggart Mr Bernard Conlan Mr J.W. Rooker Mr Alan Beith 
Mr Robert C. Brown Mr William McKelvey Mr Roland Boyes Mr Alfred Morris Mr Michael Meadowcroft 
Mr Jeremy Corbyn Mr Ray Powell Mr Richard Caborn Mr Tony Banks Mr John Forrester 
Mr Terry Patchett Mr Ted Garrett Mr John Marek Mr A.E.P. Duffy Mr Eric Deakins 
Mr Martin Flannery Mr Gordon Oakes Mr Russell Johnston Mr Stan Thorne Mr John Fraser 
Mr Ron Brown Mr Robert Edwards Sir Bernard Braine Mr Terry Lewis Mr Gareth Wardell 
Mr Sean Hughes Mr Gordon A.T. Bagier Mr Allen Adams Mr loan Evans Mr Richard Wainwright 
Mr Ernie Roberts Mr Bob Clay Mr Harry Cohen Mr Dave Nellist Ms Joan Maynard 
Mr Charles Irving Mr Ron Lewis Mr Norman Atkinson Mr Andrew Bennett Dame Judith Hart 
Mr Alex Eadie Mr Alec Woodall Mr Terry Davis Mr Barry Sheerman Mr Jim Callaghan 
Mr Simon Hughes Mr John David Taylor Mr Stephen Ross Mr Malcolm Bruce 
Mr Harry Ewing Mr Ken Weetch Mr James Wallace Mr Charles Kennedy 
Buyung Nasution 
INDONESIANS FIND INCORPORATION OF EAST TIMOR "SHAMEFUL AND SAD" 
The following is an extract from Appendix 3 of the Australian Parliamentary Delegation's report on its visit to Indonesia. Appendix 3 is the 
Record of the Delegation's Meeting with Buyung Nasution (Chairman), H.J. C. Princen (Secretary), Yap Thiam Hien and Suryadi of the 
Legal Aid Institute, in Jakarta on 23 July, 1983. 
Mr Nasution then turned to East Timar on 
which he said his views were well known, 
and had been made at home and abroad. 
He said, forcefully, that Indonesia had no 
historical claim to the province of East 
Timor and, as an intellectual, he could not 
agree that Indonesia had the right to in-
vade or incorporate East Timor. He said 
that East Timor was different from, for 
example, Irian Jaya and Aceh, which had 
always been part of Indonesia. He com-
mented that if there was an open debate on 
the subject in Indonesia the intellectuals, at 
least, would reject the incorporation of 
East Timor, which they found shameful 
and sad. Mr Morrison asked what options 
the intellectuals had for expressing this 
view. Mr Nasution answered that the op-
tions of Indonesians would be wider if their 
friends abroad, for example in IGGI coun-
tries, wouid take a firm stand on the sub-
4 
ject. He was afraid, however, that they be-
came involved with economic development 
and their response became ambiguous. he 
likened the situation to the American re-
sponse to Sukarno which resulted in the 
parlous situation of 1965. If countries like 
the United States had not supported 
Sukarno in his excesses, this would not 
have happened. He said he was extremely 
critical of Mr Whitlam's statement of 1982 
on East Timor and he had rung Peter Hast-
ings of the Sydney Morning Herald to ex-
press this view. He said that Mr Whitlam 
was wrong to have doubted the credibility 
of the two DPRD members who had 
signed a document criticising the govern-
ment.* They had brought the document to 
Jakarta - despite the government leaks 
that they had not done so - and had come 
to the LBH where they had been photo-
graphed. He re-emphasised that it was 
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necessary to maintain a strong moral 
standpoint. This view was supported by 
Senator Mclntosh who commented that 
there must be a limit to good relations if 
the price of these relations was so high. 
Haji Princen said that countries should not 
be looking at the short term benefits of re-
lations, and he said, the treatment of the 
people of East Timor was so shameful, and 
Indonesians were so unable to express 
criticism. Others should therefore look at 
it. 
* For the text of the DPRD (East Timor Reg-
ional Assembly) report, see TAPOL Bulletin 
No 47, September 1981. See also TAPOL Bulle-
tin No 50, March 1982, page 19, for the Hast-
ings' claim that the DPRD document was "a 
forgery" and that the DPRD members had 
signed "without knowing its purport". 
East Timar 
Halt the offensive in East Timor! 
Impose an arms embargo on 
Indonesia! 
The following statement, supported by organisations in the UK, Holland, Germany, Sweden and Portugal was issued on 29 September 
in London, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Frankfurt and Lisbon: 
The people of East Timor who have for nearly eight years been 
the victims of a genocidal war of annexation by Indonesia, are 
today engulfed in renewed all-out warfare. At least 20,000 crack 
Indonesian troops have launched a new invasion of their coun-
try. OVlO Broncos supplied by the USA are once again operat-
ing in East Timor; these are the aircraft which wrought such 
havoc in 1977 and 1978, killing tens of thousands and destroying 
food production, causing tens of thousands more deaths from 
starvation and disease. US-supplied Hercules transport planes 
are ferrying in !roops, helicopters supplied by West European 
countries are transporting heavy military equipment manufac-
tured in western counrtries. 
The military have tightened their grip on East Timor: all In-
donesian civilians have been evacuated from East Timor, the 
puppet Timorese governor has been removed, mass arrests have 
taken place, a dusk-to-dawn curfew is in force, the International 
Red Cross which has been running a food-relief programme has 
been required to leave the country. The Indonesian Armed 
Froces have been set the task of annihilating the Fretilin resis-
tance movement, which is supported by the entire people, before 
the end of September. 
The war of annexation which has been in progress since ·the 
first Indonesian invasion in 1975 could not have been launched 
or continued without the support of military equipment supplied 
by many western countries. Arms supplies from the West have 
been greatly stepped up since 1975 and have included frigates 
and corvettes, submarines, counter-insurgency aircraft, trans-
port planes, armoured vehicles, machine-guns and communica-
tions equipment. The very governments that licence and finance 
these exports openly admit that no act of self-determination has 
taken place in East Timor. They know that Indonesia's "integra-
tion" of East Timor is totally illegal and fundamentally conflicts 
with the wishes of the people of East Timor. Moreover, the UN 
does not accept the annexation and continues to adopt annual re-
solutions upholding the right of the Timorese people to self-de-
termination. 
The people of East Timor are engaged in a life-and-death 
struggle to uphold their right to independence. Every effort must 
be made to alert public opinion in western Europe of the catas-
l'tJN'r J/(l(fJ{Y.' ~ <ilftJG.e w: 
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trophe now engulfing East Timor. Western governments must 
take action to stop this bloodshed by: 
• imposing an arms embargo on Indonesia without delay; 
• halting economic support for Indonesia until the offensive is 
stopped; 
• calling on the UN Secretary-General to press Indonesia to 
halt the offensive. 
Stop arms exports to Indonesia! Suspend economic aid to In-
donesian aggressors! Support the people of East Timor! 
Supported by: 
United Kingdom 
T APOL, the British Campaign for the Defence of Political Pris-
oners and Human Rights in Indonesia 
COBRA, the Conference for Basic Human and Democratic 
Rights in the ASEAN Alliance 
Holland 
Dutch Indonesia Committee 
Gerakan untuk Hak-Hak Azasi dan Demokrasi (Movement for 
Basic Human Rights and Democracy in Indonesia) 
Pattimura Movement (Moluccan) 
Moluccan Education Collective 
20 May Youth Organisation (Moluccan) 
Music-Theatre Collective (Moluccan) 
Sweden 
East Timor Committee 
Free Papua Organisation (representative in Europe) 
Portugal 
CIDAC, Amilcar Cabral Information and Documentation 
Centre 
West Germany 
East Timor Solidarity Committee 
IMBAS, Human Rights Group for ASEAN Alliance countries 
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The racist overtones of 
transmigration in West Papua 
Whatever the facts and figures about the speed at which trans-
migration is now taking place in West Papua , it is clear that the 
process is leading to growing disquiet among Papuans them-
selves . Transmigration is the term used for the resettlement of 
people from the densely-populated islands of Indonesia, princi-
pally Java, to sparsely-populated parts of the community. Pa-
puans regard transmigration as a process of Javanisation, a con-
clusion that has been reinforced by statements emanating re-
cently from Isaac Hindom, the Papuan who was appointed early 
this year as the governor of Indonesia's province of Irian Jaya. 
He has for some time been actively promoting the idea that 
Papuans must assimilate themselves as quickly as possible with 
the settler-Javanese. (The word 'Papuan' is banned, so Papuans 
may only be referred to as·'putera-putera daerah' - 'sons of the 
region' - or Irianese. No other ethnic group has been subjected 
to such a prohibition by the central government.) In a statement 
late last year, Hindom claimed that since 'Irianese' food produc-
ers are "so backward", it is essential to bring in as many trans-
migrants from Java as possible to ensure development. The pol-
icy of "mixed transmigration" according to which every trans-
migration site should include 25 per cent of "locals" is com-
pletely justified, said Hindom, because local farmers are so lack-
ing in technical skills. He went even further, strongly advocating 
mixed marriages between Papuans and Javanese. ''This will give 
birth to a new generation of people without curly hair, sowing 
the seeds for greater beauty." Not content with these racist re-
marks, he also blamed the Papuans for "being so neglectful of 
their surroundings and thinking only of themselves and their 
group." He also rounded on the "separatists" for whom "the 
government and the people of Indonesia will show no mercy". 
(Kompas, 26 October 1982) 
Contempt for Papuan traditions 
These remarks caused widespread resentment in West Papua. 
According to independent sources , press clippings reporting 
Hindom's speech have circulated widely and led to feelings of 
pent-up anger because transmigration is having such harmful ef-
fects on the people in areas where the major projects have been 
located . The whole policy of transmigration is focussed on intro-
ducing an alien form of food production and shows nothing but 
contempt for the agricultural methods developed through the 
generations by the Papuan people . Transmigration also ignores 
the whole concept of land tenure which is so fundamental to Pa-
puan life . "Land tenure problems are explosive," writes Peter 
Hastings in an article in the Far Eastern Economivc Review, (6 
October 1983): 
Indonesians give no sign of understanding, or caring about in many 
instances , the realities of Melanesian land concepts . They tend to be-
lieve that having paid for compulsorily acquired or negotiated land , 
they have bought it in perpetuity . The Melanesian view is that the 
land has been rented for use only, that it is inalienable , belongs to the 
clan and is held in trust for future generations. 
The injustices perpetrated on the land question certainly go 
even farther than Hastings admits (see, for instance, the state-
ment from Japen/Waporen, page 9 ). 
According to Hastings, the forthcoming five-year plan (1984-
1988) envisages the resettlement of no fewer than one million 
Javanese in lrian Jaya. So far, he estimates that there are already 
60,000 sponsored settlers in the region, plus 160,000 unspon-
sored settlers who are now living in the urban centres and who 
largely control commerce and business. Irian Jaya has a total 
population of 1·2 million. Although Hastings doubts whether the 
five-year plan target will be achieved because of technical and 
organisational problems as well as lack of funds, he believes that 
it "is not unreasonable to expect that Irian Jaya will get its one 
million Javanese - but within ten to twelve years rather than the 
next five." 
"lrian Java" 
Governor Hindom meanwhile has recently been even more 
explicit about his visions of the future. He has now started prom-
oting the idea that Irian Jaya (Greater Irian) will soon become 
Irian Java, or Javanese Irian. The remark caused the Jakarta 
daily, Merdeka, to publish an article entitled, "What's all this 
talk about Irian Java?" (Merdeka, 19 August 1983). Hindom ap-
pears to foresee the total eclipse of the "Irianese" as they as-
similiate with the Javanese. But, according to Merdeka, this is 
not an idea welcomed by many others from the region. They see 
the Hindom concept of "lrian Java" as a process of steam-roller-
ing the ethnic and cultural values of the people. "They regard the 
idea as meaning the eclipse of one ethnic group by another 
ethnic group which would result in the obliteration of the cus-
toms, culture and life-styles of the people of Irian Jaya." 
Irian Java is a term that epitomises the whole idea of "Javani-
sation". To quote Hastings again: 
. . . there is a crucial element in all transmigration planning which is 
unmistakable - lndonesianisation. This used to be called Javanisa-
tion, but the Javanese do not like the word. But Java is the heartland 
of Indonesia , the engine that drives it. By spreading the Javanese 
throughout the islands, Indonesians are made more aware of their na-
tional identity. It is not a process non-Javanese entirely enjoy. 
The very idea that Indonesianisation is synonymous with Javani-
sation takes us to the heart of the cultural and regional policy 
currently being pursued by Indonesia's military regime. People 
like Isaac Hindom have surely been appointed to positions of 
prominence in order to give currency and legitimacy to such a 
policy of racial discrimination and. obliteration. The ~ilitary gov-
ernment's slogan for eliminating political diversity is the concept 
of azas tunggal, the requirement that all political parties and or-
ganisations adhere to the single ideology of the Panca Si/a. Simi-
larly in cultural and regional affairs, diversity has to be elimi-
nated, and the concept that has been chosen is that of Javanisa-
tlon. The process inevitably arouses resentment particularly in a 
place like West Papua where the whole saga of incorporation 
into the Republic was fraught with so much force and violence. 
(See West Papua, The Ob/iteration of a People, published this 
year by TAPOL.) 
To criticise the concept of Javanisation does not mean accus-
ing the Javanese of being expansionist. This is a concept that 
serves the interests of the military regime which knows very well 
that if the people of West Papua were untramelled by political 
restrictions and granted freedom of expression, the demand for 
the right to self-determination would be overwhelming. The best 
way to eliminate such a source of unrest once and for all is by en-
forced assimilation, and the impoverished and land-hungry 
Javanese peasants are simply being used as the means to attain 
that objective. It is a welcome sign that a Jakarta newspaper like 
Merdeka has raised the issue, albeit within what might be re-
garded as "safe" limits. Papuans themselves, given the chance to 
speak their minds freely, would deal with the racist outpourings 
of Hindom in far more strident terms. But for the time being, we 
must rely on smuggled documents, such as the one that reached 
us recently from Japen. (See page 9 .) 
6 TAPOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983 
West Papua 
T APOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983 7 
West Papua 
Disappearances in West Papua 
A former Papuan political prisoner in Jayapura, Celsius Wapai, 
who is now a refugee in Papua New Guinea recently sent infor-
mation to T APOL about prisoners who disappeared in West 
Papua while being held in custody by the Indonesian au-
thorities. Celsius Wapai was himself detained for three years by 
the military authorities in Irian Jaya and held by the Intelligence 
Detachment of the Cendrawasih Military Command from 10 
July 1979 until June 1982 when he managed to escape from de-
tention and fled with his wife and five children to Papua New 
Guinea. They escaped from Irian Jaya in a rowing boat, landing 
on the PNG coast after being at sea for 2 days and one night. 
Celsius Wapai reports as follows: 
"Marthin Gusibius TABU disappeared from the Kodim/1701 
Jayapura prison at (Upper) Dok II some time between 17 Sep-
tember and the beginning of October 1981. I last saw him being 
driven off in an army-owned Toyota car of the Irian Jaya Reg-
ional Military Command (Kodam), in the company of a lieuten-
ant named Balubun, together with another soldier who was driv-
ing. Two other soldiers were in the vehicle, a Javanese captain 
and someone else I could not identify . 
"I was told by an officer that Marthin Tabu had been moved 
from Jayapura to Biak on the joint initiative of Kodam Jayapura 
and the Commander of the IVth Territorial Region of Irian Jaya 
and the Moluccas (Kowilhan IV) in order to keep him from any 
contact with his followers who had earlier tried to break into his 
place of detention. 
"From that time up to my own escape from prison, I heard 
nothing more about Marthin Tabu. I cannot say for sure that he 
was killed because I have myself seen no evidence of this, but I 
consider his disappearance as being very mysterious. There were 
frequent occasions when the Indonesian authorities deliberately 
hid Marthin Tabu as part of their war of nerves with the mass 
media, and to impress people into thinking that they are 
civilised. 
"Marthin Tabu was arrested on 19 April 1980 at the ABRI 
Post in Waris, not far from the border with PNG. Two or three 
hundred of his men watched it from a radius of 150-200 metres. 
He was trapped by Lieutenant-Colonel Soetarno, First Assis-
tant/Intelligence at KODAM XVIII. (Lt. Col. Soetarno was for-
merly in Kalimantan and was recently sent to Bali to help crush 
Fretilin in East Timor). 
"On 15 April 1980, the military command of Irian Jaya and 
OPM, represented respectively by Lt. Col. Soetarno and the 
Arso leader Marthin Tabu reached a bilateral accord to meet for 
discussions about the security situation. They had agreed to meet 
at the ABRI post in Waris, just the two of them without their 
men. But Marthin had unfortunately neglected to consider his 
own previous experience of kidnapping and holding hostage 
high-ranking military officers and government officials in the 
mid 1970s. Four minutes after the helicopter bringing Lt. Col. 
Soetarno touched down, two more ABRI helicopters arrived dis-
rupting the view surrounding the OPM leader. His men who 
were standing some distance away reacted too slowly. They were 
stunned to see how their commander had been tricked, and 
watched helpless as he was handcuffed and Jed away by Sgt. Ab-
dullah, an intelligence officer from Sulawesi. 
"Ferdinana BAL/BA, a native of Genyem, subdistrict of Nimbo-
ran, was shot dead on the Grime Bridge. He was an immigration 
official and was shot dead in an ABRI operation. He was disem-
bowelled and his remains strewn along the bridge. He was shot 
by men of KOREM 752 (Military Resort Command 752) in a 
joint operation with other ABRI forces. At the time of his death 
Baliba was still quite young, with a wife and one or two small 
children. 
"David MASSA, from Nimboran, was murdered in a most inhu-
man fashion, in December 1981 or January 1982. He was killed 
after being in ABRI custody for just a few days. Shortly after his 
arrest he was taken by a soldier from the nearby ABRI post and 
driven to Doyolama,district of Sentani, in Jayapura district. In a 
place 50-70 metres from the road where the victim had first been 
ordered to dig his own grave, he was hit twice in the nape of his 
neck with a crowbar. Because there were still some signs of life, 
a soldier drew his bayonet and thrust it into the victim's stomach. 
He fell into the grave and was buried there at between 10 and 11 
that night." 
Massacres in 1981 
"In the period from September to December 1981 more than 
2,500 people were murdered in joint operations to combat the 
guerrilla activities of the OPM. The people massacred were in-
habitants of the interior regions of Kelila, Oksibil, Waghete, 
Enarotali and Kota Perak. The massacres were carried out dur-
ing the Operasi Sapuh Bersih I and II (Clean Sweep Operations) 
which were launched on the orders of Brig. Gen. C.I. Santoso as 
KODAM XVII commander, together with Lt. Col. Armijo 
Siregar, KODAM first Assistant/Intelligence. 
"As part of the same operations, twenty human heads were 
buried in the vicinity of the office of the Intelligence Unit of 
KODAM XVII, which is where I was being detained at the time. 
The burial of these heads occurred on 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 
21 September 1981. I myself saw these heads of OPM members. 
One of them, as I recollect, was the head of someone who was 
blind in one eye." 
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Illegal land seizures 
A report from the district of Yapen-Waropen (two islands in the 
Cendrawasih Bay) just received by the Free Papua Movement in 
Holland provides information about land expropriation by the 
military authorities without regard for the rights of the owners or 
users of the land in question. The following details are given: 
• The Yapen-Waropen (Yawa) bupati's* office was built on 
land expropriated in 1969. Demands for the restoration of 
these land rights have been completely ignored. 
• In 1970, nine houses for administration officials were built on 
land owned by the Tanawani family, and ten were built on 
land owned by the Burumi family. Not a cent of compensation 
has been paid till now (1983). 
• In 1970, the regional Education Department office was built 
on a cocoa estate owned by the Manderi family. The cocoa 
bushes were destroyed, but no compensation has been paid 
till now. 
• The Indonesian colonialists in Yawa have bought up people's 
land at dirt-cheap prices. The camat** of South Yapen paid 
100 sheets of zinc for land measuring 30 by 40 metres, then re-
sold the land for eight million rupiahs. Lieutenant Tarwan, a 
Koramil officer in South Yapen, cheated many people in the 
villages of Kando, Famboaman and Menawi out of a great 
deal of land, making use of his powers as a member of the In-
donesian Armed Forces. 
• The Leprosy Hospital was built in 1956 on land owned by the 
Tanawani family, which had been contracted by the Dutch 
colonial government for 25 years. The contract expired in 
1981 but the Indonesian government has decided that the 
cont;act was invalid and has expropriated the land without 
compensation. 
• From 1970 onwards many people were driven from their kam-
pongs which were re-established as Famboaman and Kando 
villages. To the west, the Kodim was set up, and to the east, 
houses for government administrators were built. No compen-
sation was paid either for the land or for the homes that .were 
demolished. All this happened when the post of bupan was 
occupied by Drs Sarwoto, then J.L Worumi, then Drs A. Is-
mail. 
• The local administration has forbidden the people to sell their 
land privately. Yet officials of the administratio~ secretly. buy 
up people's land and re-sell it at extremely profitable pnces. 
The impact of transmigration 
A statement warning of the harmful effects of transmigra-
tion on people Jiving in those parts of West Papua where 
resettlement is under way has come from a document com-
piled by representatives of the people of Japen-Waropen, 
in the Cendrawasih Bay. The statement which is addressed 
to the United Nations makes the following points: 
• Thousands of settler (transmigrant) families are arriving 
annually in West Papua. Many are the families of sol-
diers who are expected to play a role in protecting trans-
migration sites against possible challenge from local 
Papuan groups who resent their presence. The settlers 
from outside are given generous facilities: land, free 
housing and seeds, proper health facilities and so on, 
whilst the needs of the Papuans living in the locality are 
ignored. 
• Inter-marriage is being strongly encouraged, to speed 
up the process of assimilation. Many marriages a~e 
polygamous (settler men taking Papuan .women as t?elf 
second or third wives) and lead to abortions, desertions 
and a variety of moral problems. 
• The settlers all come from Java; the transmigration 
programme is thus part of the process of the Javanisa-
tion of West Papua. 
• Transmigrants enjoy far better job opportunities, thus 
restricting even further the jobs locally available for the 
local inhabitants. This is being felt right across the job 
market from unskilled work to the civil service. The 
school ~ystem is also being overwhelmed by the influx 
of non-Papuan children making it more difficult for 
Papuan children to find places or make progress in what 
is becoming an alien environment. 
• The government-sponsored programme of family plan-
ning seems to be intent upon cutting down ~he numb~r 
of Papuans, and is thus part of a plan leadmg to their 
eventual elimination as a people . 
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Police close down Bung Karno 
University 
The Minister of Education, Dr Nugroho Notosusanto, has re-
fused to allow the establishment of a private uiniversity named 
after the former Indonesian president Sukarno, familiarly known 
as Bung Kama. The university campus has been placed under 
police guard, no one is allowed to enter, and all administrative 
activities have had to be abandoned . 
The university was to have started operations at the beginning 
of the 1983/84 academic year. It already has 4,000 registered stu-
dents and 350 lecturers on the staff. 
The director of Bung Kama University, Rachmawati 
Sukarno, daughter of the late president, says that efforts to 
launch the university have been obstructed right from the start. 
Plans to hold entrance exams at the Senayan Conference Centre 
had to be called off after the Jakarta police refused permission 
for this event to take place. When police then banned exams at 
the university's own campus, the academic board decided to dis-
pense with the idea of holding entrance exams and accept all 
those who had enrolled. 
The Education Department's ban gives as the reasons the 
University's "failure to comply with technical, academic and ad-
ministrative requirements", but Rachmawati Sukarno insists that 
all requirements have been met. She has tried to meet the Minis-
ter of Education to discuss the ban, only to be fobbed off by offi-
cials who claim he is "too busy" . A letter from her to President 
Suharto has remained unanswered. 
According to press reports, other private universities in 
Jakarta which have not yet been granted permits have not been 
prevented from operating by the kind of police action taken 
against the Bung Karna University. TEMPO suggests that the 
government has taken strong exception to the use of the late pre-
sident's name. Whatever the reason for the ban, 4,000 students 
have been thwarted in their efforts to continue their studies at a 
time when existing universities are unable to absorb the very 
large number of school-leavers looking for university places. 
Sources: Topic, 1 November and Tempo, 29 October, 1983 
Army killings continue 
Three thousand people have already been killed by Army death 
squads in the past six months. The killings are still very much in 
progress, the worst areas being West Java, Sumatra and 
Sulawesi. Mulya Lubis, chairman of the Legal Aid Institute's 
Foundation gave these facts in a sta'tement reported by the 
Dutch press (Volkskrant, 24 October 1983). The Institute in a 
statement on 11th November stressed that the killings had inten-
sified since the government banned press coverage of murders 
(Guardian 12th November 1983). 
Since August, the Indonesian press has been prohibited from 
reporting the killings, but there has been no let-up in the death-
squad campaign. The victims are said to be known criminals, re-
ferred to as gali-gali (youth gangs) many of whom are easily 
identifiable because they have vivid tattoos on their bodies. Most 
victims are shot at point-blank range, knifed or strangled with 
plastic cord. 
Mulya Lubis also said that the government has received pro-
tests about the killings from many countries including the USA, 
Japan, West Germany, the UK, France, Holland, Australia and 
Switzerland. 
Mass Execution 
From contacts in Jakarta, T APOL has received news of a mass 
execution of "gali-gali" in the village of Rengas-Dengklok, West 
Java, in September. No fewer than forty people were put to 
death at one go by an Army firing-squad . A villager who fled to 
Jakarta soon after the incident explained that , early one morn-
ing, the village head (lurah) assembled the villagers an? or?ered 
them to watch the executions. He introduced the soldiers m the 
firing-squad as "mysterious killers" , the term by which the sol-
diers of the death squads are known because no one dares to 
identify them as being members of the Army. 
Killer Squads consist of East Timor War Veterans 
According to David Jenkins (Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 
September 1983) , the death squads are drawn from the paracom-
mando unit, KOPASSANDHA (formerly known as RPKAD), 
who are "veterans of the bitter war in East Timor": 
Typically , a team of four powerfully b.uil_t young m~n arrive in a jeep 
at the home or hideout of a known cnmmal, and either gun the man 
down in front of his screaming wife and children, or kidnap him ; in 
the latter case , the man's body is generally found floating face-down 
in a nearby stream. 
Jenkins also reports that the campaign "looks set to continue 
until the authorities have reached their countrywide target, reli-
ably put at 4,000 extra-judicial murders". The writer believes 
that the order to prohibit further news coverage of the murder 
campaign issued in August was intended to head off growing in-
ternational condemnation. (This may have been the govern-
ment's way of responding to the international protests referred 
to by Mulya Lubis above.) 
Intimidation 
T APO L's own sources in Jakarta add that intimidation and ter-
ror are clear objectives of the campaign. For instance on 2nd Au-
gust, the body of a murdered victim was thrown onto the porch 
of a house in the village of Kenayan, in the region of Borobudur, 
Central Java. Kenayan is the centre of the struggle still being 
waged to prevent villagers from being removed from their homes 
and land to make way for the tourism and recreation project now 
under construction in the vicinity of the Borobudur Buddhist 
temple (see TAPOL Bulletin, No 54, November 1982). 
Borobudur cries out 
Residents in Borobudur Temple, an historic shrine in Central 
Java, have appealed for international support in their contest 
with Indonesian Java (sic) security forces. 
Terror tactics and intimidation by the military have caused 
almost all of the remaining population around the Temple to 
move away. They have gone to make way for a tourist park built 
with Japanese capital. 
The Borobudur Temple was recently restored with UNESCO 
assistance. Subsequently a decision was made by the Indonesian 
Government Tourist Association to build an extensive tourist 
park around the Temple. Minimal compensation was offered to 
the residents of surrounding villages to move away from the 
temple area.* 
For some months many of the families especially from the 
villages of Krajan and Kenayan have resisted by refusing to 
move from their homes. They have argued that they are part of 
the temple and that their lives are bound up with its cultural 
heritage. 
If they move they will not only lose their ancestral association 
with the temple, but will also be replaced by others coming as the 
residents and servants of the temple. 
The present residents ask only to be an integral part of the 
renovations that are taking place around the temple and not to 
be cast out. They claim their heritage makes them as much a part 
of the temple as the stone carvings now restored. 
Security forces and the Department of Agrarian Affairs think 
otherwise. They have used intimidation and terrorist tactics to 
remove the people forcibly from their houses. 
Matters came to a head on July 31 during a meeting of 30 
heads of families. On that and the following day the villagers 
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were accused of holding illegal and subversive meetings. 
Some were arrested . Others were given an option of taking 
one of three cards . A choice of red card if they refused to move, 
green card if they moved but wanted to continue discussions and 
a white card if they took the compensation offered and moved. 
A red card would put them in the category of an undesirable 
criminal, the same category as hundreds of others who have been 
mysteriously shot dead during the past few months in several 
parts of Indonesia. 
One of those who refused to move was Mr Setro Wikromo. 
On the following day he awoke to find a dead body shot in the 
head at close range across his door step. Authorities refused to 
remove it for almost 24 hours. It was a crude terrorist warning of 
what might happen to any further resisters. 
Although most of the residents of Krajan have now moved, 
there are still 80 families whose fate is undetermined . Urgent 
assistance is needed in the form of letters and telegrams of 
appeal for these people of Krajan and Kenayan villages. Letters 
and telegrams should be sent immediately to:Ismael Gubernur 
Kepala Daerah Tingkat I, Semarang, Jawa Tengah, Indonesia 
and to: Bupati, Kepala Dati II, Kabupaten Magelang, Jawa 
Tengah, Indonesia. 
These protests are intended to stop further harassment of the 
local people and to request they be given an opportunity to be 
part of the renovations at Borobudur Temple. 
From Asian Bureau Australia, August, 1983. 
*See TAPOL Bulletin No 54, November 1982 for a detailed account of 
the issues at stake in this dispute. 
1974 student leaders lose appeal to 
Supreme Court 
Two student leaders of the 1974 protest movement, Hariman 
Siregar and Syahrir, could soon be returned to prison to serve 
·' .. 
Pelita, 21 May 1983 
the remainder of prison sentences passed in 1974 and 1975, 
following a Supreme Court rejection of their pleas for cassation. 
The two men made their pleas in 1976, but it took the Court 
seven years to pass its verdict, in November this year. 
They immediately lodged grasi pleas to the President. Under 
existing laws, they could be returned to prison whilst grasi pleas 
are considered but the Public Prosecutor decided on a Iast-
minute stay of execution . 
The 1974 student protest movement culminated in a huge 
demonstration on the streets of Jakarta on 15 January 1974 in 
protest against the visit to Indonesia of Japanese Prime Minister 
Tanaka . Many students were arrested after the demonstration, 
of whom three were later brought to trial, Hariman Siregar, 
Syahrir and Moh. Aini Chalid. Others arrested at the time and 
held for around two years without trial included well-known 
human rights activists and lawyers such as Buyung Nasution, 
Yap Thiam Hien and H.C. Princen. 
Hariman Siregar, a medical student, was chairman of the Stu-
dents Council of the University of Indonesia. He was tried under 
the Anti-Subversion Law, found guilty and sentenced to six 
years. On appeal, the High Court reduced this sentence to 4112 
years in April 1976. In its ctecision, the Supreme Court not only 
rejected Hariman's appeal, but accepted an appeal by the pro-
secution for the restoration of Hariman's original sentence of six 
years, annulling the High Court decision. Hariman spent two 
years and seven months in prison-from January 1974 until Au-
gust 1976-and was released "on humanitarian grounds". He 
must therefore serve another three years and five months of hi's 
original sentence. Since his release in 1976 he has graduated and 
practised for several years as a doctor. 
Syahrir was secretary of the University of Indonesia Discus-
sion Group which held a number of debates in the months prior 
to the January protest movement. He had just completed his 
studies at the University of Indonesia's Economics Faculty at the 
time the protests occurred. Syahrir was tried early in 1975, also 
under the Anti-Subversion Law; it was charged that the Discus-
sion Group had been the "brains" behind the protest and had 
"instigated" the students. He was found guilty and sentenced to 
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6 112 years. This sentence was reduced on appeal to the High 
Court to six years in May 1975. The Supreme Court has now con-
firmed the High Court's decision . Since Syahrir was held in de-
tention from January 1974 until November 1977, a total of three 
years and ten months, he still has two years and two months to 
serve . He has recently returned to Indonesia after completing a 
Ph .D . thesis at Harvard University. 
The sentence of the third man tried in connection with the 
1974 protests, Moh Aini Chalid, was also upheld by the Supreme 
Court. But since he had already served the period fixed, he was 
not required to go back to prison. Aini Chalid adopted a very 
non-cooperative attitude during his trial. He refused to brief a 
defence lawyer, refused to call witnesses and offered no defence 
plea . He had intended using his trial to expose the role of Gen-
eral Ali Murtopo in provoking riots and looting during the 15 
January demonstration, but the court obstructed any mention of 
General Murtopo. A fourth defendant, Ramadi, died in deten-
tion in mysterious circumstances after he had revealed to other 
detainees that Murtopo supplied Rp. 35 million to organise the 
provocations. It was the death of Ramadi and the obstructions 
he encountered during his own trial that led Aini Chalid to con-
demn the proceedings as a farce and to refuse to cooperate. Aini 
was sentenced to four years, which was reduced to two years and 
three months on appeal to the High Court. He was released after 
serving the full term. 
Why now? 
For an appraisal of the reasons for the sudden re-emergence of 
these 1974 cases, it is worth noting that the 1974 student leaders 
were the first major "trouble-makers" of the post-1965 New 
Order era, the first generation of dissidents to be tried under the 
Anti-Subversion Law. The charges against them included "un-
dermining government authority", "attempting to subvert the 
basic guidelines of the State" and "challenging the position of the 
Head of State". The Supreme Court's decision, which is undoub-
tedly politically motivated, may be intended as a public display 
of the military government's determination to exact full retribu-
tion from those who have dared to challenge its supremacy. With 
the government focussing hard on its "single ideology" policy*) 
against the opposition of Muslim youth groups, it may wish to re-
mind dissidents of what could befall them if they persist. 
*The "single ideology" (azas tunggal) decision requires all politi-
cal parties and organisations to abandon all beliefs or political 
programmes and adhere only to the State ideology of the Panca 
Sila. 
Muslim journal and books seized 
Ten thousand copies of the monthly jour-
nal of a Jogjakarta-based Muslim youth or-
ganisation were seized and confiscated by 
troops of Jogjakarta KOREM 072 (Milit-
ary Resort Command). They also confis-
cated fifty copies of a book (see below) and 
some 200 copies of a bulletin published by 
the Iranian Embassy. Four persons were 
arrested; they were identified only by their 
initials, as MAF, RZ, NJB and HZ. The 
latter person is a student at a private uni-
versity in Jogjakarta. 
AR-RISALAH, the journal that was 
seized, is published by the Communication 
Body for Youth of the Mosques (BKBM). 
Major Wahyoe Soemantri, head of intelli-
gence of the Jogja Military Command ac-
cused the journal of "undermining the au-
thorities", of "depicting the government as 
infidels", and of "smuggling revolutionary 
concepts into the country from abroad". 
"They are calling on people to engage in 
revolution, in opposition to the Pancasila. 
That is subversive," said Major Soemantri. 
"It is even suspected that the journal is re-
ceiving funds from the Middle East". 
Irfan, the journal's editor, said that it 
aims at propagating Muslim thoughts, 
struggling for these ideas and providing a 
means of communication for young people 
active in mosque affairs. It started off in 
1981 as a small four-page tabloid printing 
2,000 copies, but has grown quickly to 
twelve pages, with 10,000 copies. The 
readership has grown fast and many read-
ers provide hefty contributions to keep it 
going. The October issue which was seized 
by the Army contained the 1983 statement 
of the Petition-of-SO group (a group which 
launched a petition criticising the govern-
12 
ment in 1981), an article about Ayatollah 
Khomeini and one about the headscarves 
controversy. (Muslim schoolgirls are being 
prohibited from wearing headscarves at 
school. See TAPOL Bulletin No. 59, Sep-
tember 1983). 
As far as is known, Ar-Risalah has not 
yet been banned by the government. 
Defence Pleas also seized 
Fifty copies of a book entitled Perjalanan 
Hukum Indonesia, Sebuah Gugatan (In-
d~nesian Law, A Challenge) were also 
seized at the Ar-Risalah office. The book 
reproduces the defence pleas of two Mus-
lim_ ~e~endants who were tried for political 
actlVlbes, Abdullah Sungkar and 
Abubakar Ba'asyir. The book carries an 
TAPOL Bulletin No. 60 November 1983 
introduction by the human rights lawyer, 
Buyung Nasution and was published by the 
BKPM. "We published it," said Irfan "be-
cause no newspapers were prepared to give 
these documents any coverage". 
Sources: Tempo, 22 October, and Sinar 
Harapan, 15 October 1983 
Government obstructing publication 
of LBH 1983 report 
The 1983 Annual Report of the 
Legal Aid Institute (LBH) which is 
understood to be ready for publica-
tion is facing difficulties because of 
government obstructions. 
The former chairman of the LBH 
Foundation, Buyung Nasution, told 
the Australian Parliamentary Dele-
gation which visited Jakarta in July 
this year that the government was 
exerting pressure on the publisher 
not to publish the Report "unless 
there were changes in the nature of 
the report". (See Australian Par-
liamentary Delegation Report, page 
92.) . 
The Report is normally published 
by the Sinar Harapan publishing 
house, publishers of the large Christ-
ian Jakarta daily of the same name. 
Past reports have provided a wide-
ranging account of the state of 
human rights in Indonesia. The last 
re~ort drew attention among other 
thmgs to the many political disap-
pearances that have occurred and 
also included a section of human 
rights abuse in East Tim or. 
East Timor interview 
Life during the resistance 
1975-1978 
Neobere, an East Timorese who left Dili in January this year and is now living as a refugee in Portugal, spent three years fighting with 
the resistance. Until his capture in November 1978, he gained wide experience of the conditions under which people fought against 
the Indonesian occupation, in particular the devastating bombardments by Indonesian aircraft and naval vessels, causing a huge loss 
of life. After spending several months as a captive with an Indonesian military unit in the south eastern region of Matebian, he 
escaped to Dili and remained there until his departure for Lisbon this year. 
On a visit to London in May, Neobere was interviewed at length by T APOL. Part of this interview, dealing with the current 
situarion was published in TAPOL Bulletin No 58. 
Could you describe your personal experiences of Indonesian 
military operations, the invasion and the resistance, going back to 
the time of the UDT coup in August 1975? 
In 1975 I was working as a nurse for the Portuguese colonial 
administration in Suai, a town near the south coast about 20 kms 
from the border with West Timor. Well before the Indonesians 
invaded Dili in December, war was raging in this southern 
border region. I should explain that when the UDT launched the 
coup in Dili in August, they also tried to control Suai and other 
places. The UDT killed many people in Suai as well as in the 
countryside, and during that time the Indonesian troops across 
the border did nothing. They just watched. 
On 20 August, Fretilin launched its counter-offensive against 
the UDT in Dili, and spontaneous actions happened elsewhere 
too, including Suai. Everyone joined forces with Fretilin, 
including members of the Portuguese army~ Then the UDT 
people fled, some across the border, some to Baucau in the 
north. Some tried to hold out in Balibo, but they were 
outnumbered by Fretilin supporters, and defeated. 
In these months before December, there was a great deal of 
fighting and many people wanted to leave the country, including 
my own family, so I went with then to Dili, then to Balibo. Many 
people went across the border, including my wife, but I didn't 
want to leave because I was a Fretilin supporter, so I went back 
to Dili then to Suai. Already in September, Indonesian troops 
were coming across the border. They used bazookas and hand-
grenades, and burnt down houses. They entered the towns -
Tilumar for instance - and shot people. Some Fretilin soldiers, 
members of Falintil, were shot dead in these encounters. The 
Indonesians came across at night and returned to Indonesian 
territory the next morning. A man I knew, named Manuel, was 
killed on 18 September. In fact, I even remember an incident in 
the area before the beginning of September when some 
Indonesians were killed. I captured documents from an 
Indonesian soldier at the time. In that encounter two Fretilin 
soldiers and four Indonesians were killed. So you see, 
throughout September and October, there was heavy fighting. 
Were you yourself fighting with Fretilin troops, in Falintil? 
No, not really, because I was working as a nurse. When 
Indonesian par~troops invaded Dili on 7 December, their troops 
also tried to cross the border and take control but we resisted 
them and they made little headway. In February, Indonesian 
paratroops were dropped on Suai and tried to spread into the 
interior. At the same time, their troops advanced across the 
border. We resisted them from both these directions, but by 
March it was too much for us so we retreated to the hills. And 
people in the towns, in Suai and Tilumar, also left for the hills. 
They had heard how Indonesians committed atrocities, stole 
people's possessions, raped the women, how they had shot many 
people, even Apodeti members who supported integration with 
Indonesia. So everyone wanted to leave, to go to the hills and 
resist the invaders. 
After the UDT was defeated and the Portuguese withdrew to 
Atauro island, was Fretilin able to set up an administration from 
September to December 1975? 
Fretilin sent political representatives to all districts and sub-
districts to explain their policy, so there were local people who 
received advice and instructions from Fretilin. But it isn't 
possible to speak of any effective administration because so 
much fighting was going on in our region. There were still some 
UDT people around, the Indonesians were making incursions 
across the border and there were Indonesian naval vessels just 
off the coast. 
What experiences of the resistance did you have in the years 
following the invasion? 
Because of the work I was doing as a nurse I travelled round a 
great deal. In 1976 I travelled all along the coastal areas, north 
and south. In 1977 I travelled extensively in the mountainous 
regions, and I was in the central region in 1978. This was up to 
November 1978, after the Indonesians had taken Uatocarabau 
in the Matabian region, though the areas outside the town were 
still in Fretilin hands. After Uatocarabau was taken in 
September 1978, many people fled to the mountains. The 
Indonesians had 13 battalions there. When they tried to gain 
control of the mountain regions many of their men were killed, 
so they started the bombing raids, with OVlO Broncos as well as 
supersonic jets. The jets caused many fires. 
Life goes on as usual. From a collection of photos taken in Fretilin-
controlled areas in early 1983. 
What type of jets were they? 
I don't know.* They approached so fast that we had to take 
cover immediately. It was different with the OVlOs, which 
approached much more slowly and made a lot of noise. We could 
*These could possibly have been A-4 Skyhawks. 
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identify them and had plenty of time to take cover. But the jets 
were far more dangeorous and we never hung around long 
enough to see the markings. Many people died in Matabian and 
earlier in Suai , though generally speaking not the guerrillas. The 
guerrillas used tactics to escape extinction. For instance, they 
would often get up close to Indonesian troop positions to avoid 
being bombed. But many other people were killed. Many were 
killed when they took shelter in caves because the cave entrance 
became blocked so they died inside from lack of oxygen. Some 
were caught under boulders. Here in the eastern central region 
there were large concentrations of Timorese, up in the Matabian 
mountains, in Uatulari , Uatocarabau , Kelikai, and farther east 
in Los Palos. By 1978, Indonesian troops had entered these 
towns. Then , they managed to penetrate into the mountain 
regions and drove the people down , forcing them into the towns 
under their control. These operations took place after periods of 
intense bombing. 
People were forced into confined areas, and had to remain 
there. Initially these areas were surrounded by troops because 
they were afraid the people would escape and go back to the 
mountains or make contact with the resistance . I reckon that in 
those days the Indonesians must have had fifty or sixty battalions 
in East Timor. Later, these areas of population concentration 
were fenced in . 
Resistance continued all through 1978, 1979 and 1980, but the 
guerrilla movement had become widely dispersed and the groups 
were separated from each other. In 1980, Falintil was able to re-
group and re-organise, and the level of resistance again 
intensified. There has been a lot of bitter fighting since then, in 
1981 and 1982. Only shortly before I left, some time last 
November, a battle occurred in Los Palos; an Indonesian sub-
lieutenant and many other soldiers were killed. Because of this, 
the Indonesians brought more troops into the country, 
altogether six extra battalions, and deployed them in Same and 
Ainaru where the fighting had taken place . In late 1982, a battle 
also took place to the east of Dili when a Timorese named Abilio 
da Silva, fighting on the side of the Indonesians, was killed. 
There are many Timorese fighting with the Indonesians. They 
have been forced to join the army and are put right in the 
frontline. If they refuse to carry out orders, they are accused of 
being Fretilin supporters and can be shot. This is their 
Timorisation of the war - giving Timorese weapons, putting 
them in uniforms. I think they do this because the Indonesian 
soldiers are afraid of fighting us, so they use Timorese instead. 
There are two Indonesian battalions, composed entirely of 
Timorese, Battalions 744 and 745. They have the hansip (civil 
guard) as well, who are all Timorese; they have to fight in the 
frontline and can be shot dead if they refuse to fight Fretilin. 
Quite a few Timorese have been killed like this. 
Have the Indonesians used chemical weapons or napalm? 
It's very possible though I can't say for sure, as I have no 
personal experience of it. What I do know is that in some places 
that were bombed, everything got burnt as a result, gardens as 
". . . after a bombing raid, maggots would 
come and destroy the crops . . . " 
well as houses. In some places, a day or two after a bombing 
raid, a plague of maggots would come and destroy the crops. The 
Indonesians must have dropped things that hatched into insects 
to destroy our crops. Or sometimes after a bombing raid, many 
people had violent attacks of vomiting and dysentery from the 
drinking water. This kind of thing happened in the Matabian 
region, in 1977 and 1978. 
What about food production during those years of resistance up 
to 1978? 
When we first retreated to the hills we had no idea the 
struggle would last so long. We had taken food with us and lived 
on that . But then we had to start producing food. Much the same 
pattern developed everywhere . The main crops grown were 
maize, cassava, potatoes and rice . Where I was we couldn't grow 
much rice because it has to be grown on hill-slopes and we were 
too high up the mountains . Around Suai we were very restricted 
in the kinds of food we could grow, so we got rice by exchanging 
things with people in other regions. We developed a system of 
exchange in the interior. We could grow coffee and exchanged it 
for other things. We also transported it to areas ·occuped by the 
enemy, for exchange. As for soap, clothing and so on, the things 
we had wore out. To replenish our stocks we attacked enemy 
positions and often captured money, then found ways of using 
this money with the help of people living in the occupied areas. 
Anyone caught doing this kind of thing would be shot 
immediately, so we had to be very careful. 
What about the medical services during that period of the 
resistance? 
At first, things were extremely difficult. I hadn't been able to 
take any medical supplies or equipment when I left Suai because 
the Indonesians had landed already. So we used roots, herbs and 
so on as medicines. Then we had to rely on supplies we managed 
to capture from the enemy. We got bandages and medicines this 
way, and sometimes even surgical instruments. I continue to 
work as a nurse, caring for the sick . 
What was the health situation like? 
Well, we knew we were completely on our own and that we 
could expect help from no one. The will to fight was very strong 
and that helped m; to survive and keep strong. As you can 
imagine, it wasn't easy but we knew that we had nothing to hope 
for but fighting the enemy or death, and this helped us to 
survive. 
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Did you manufacture medicines? 
Yes, we had two centres for ~aking medicines, in Lakluta 
and in the Matabian region. We developed a method of drying 
potatoes and maize, then grinding this into a fine powder. Then 
we boiled medicinal leaves and mixed the extract with this 
powder. Later we developed a better method; we constructed 
rudimentary distilleries and distilled the extract we obtained 
from the boiled leaves and roots. This improved the quality of 
the medicines we produced. We also discovered a way of 
producing soap. At first we used ash which contains potash, but 
we soon realised that this quickly damaged our clothes. Then we 
discovered that the fruit of a tree widely found in Timor was very 
useful for producing soap. We boiled the fruit, burning it into a 
fine ash; then we boiled the seeds of the fruit separately which 
produced an oily substance. We mixed these two substances 
together, left the mixture to set for several days in shapes, and 
got bars of soap. 
We also discovered a way of re-charging batteries for our 
radios. At first we did this ,by using energy produced from 
pedalling bikes very fast and for a long time, but as you can 
imagine, this was extremely tiring. So then we thought of 
creating energy with water. There aren't any waterfalls in Timor, 
so we had to use pipes to create our own falls with water from a 
high elevation. These falls were used to turn wheels which was 
how we created energy to charge our batteries. We also thought 
of ways to make explosives to blow up enemy tanks. 
What was the role of the priests? 
They just continued to function normally, performing 
marriages, christenings. I was once the best man at my friend's 
wedding. Fretilin used to capture wine for mass. The priests 
always went with the people. Fretilin respects religion and 
upholds the right of people to profess their own beliefs, so there 
was always a good level of understanding and tolerance between 
Fretilin and the priests. 
To jump ahead for a moment, a Portuguese journalist who was in 
Children, in the Fretilin-controlled area, dance the Unity Dance . 
.::· ··· 
East Timor recently has described the Catholic Church's position 
there as being a form of passive resistance. Would you agree? 
Yes, generally speaking, that's true. The Bishop of Dili 
himself frequently visits the settlement areas where most of the 
people live, to keep in touch. The Church's task is basically to 
care for people's souls, but the priests see daily the inhumanity 
of the Indonesian occupants and have to speak out against it. 
This has aroused the displeasure of the Indonesians who accuse 
the church of collaborating with Fretilin. It's no secret that this is 
why the Indonesians want to get rid of the Bishop.* 
What about church services? Do the priests express views about 
the situation in their sermons? 
People in Timar are very religious, and they have built their 
own places of worship in many settlements, but the occupying 
soldiers often harass church-goers. People sometimes go to their 
church for mass, only to find it filthy with human excrement. 
This is the work of the soldiers who also sometimes damage the 
statues. In Lacolo, they destroyed a statue of St Vincent. The 
soldiers don't actually break up services, but they go in for this 
kind of desecration which creates an atmosphere of intimidation 
and contempt for the people's beliefs. 
As far as I know, the priests don't openly comment on the 
situation in their sermons; they just limit themselves to 
describing a Christian's duty, which is a way of conveying 
messages about justice to the congregation. The one who does 
this kind of thing more openly is Mgr da Costa Lopez, the 
Bishop. When the massacres occurred . in Lakluta in 1981 he 
openly condemned them though he fell short of actually 
mentioning the perpetrators. 
Can we retrun now to your own experiences in 1978. How were 
you captured? 
*This refers to Mgr Martinhu da Costa Lopez. In fact, shortly 
after this interview, information was received that he had been 
forced to resign. He is now living in Lisbon . 
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In 1977, the Indonesians brought 13'battalions to the region 
of Matabian , which is where I was at the time . I know for sure 
the number of battalions because an Indonesian soldier later told 
me. The first time the occupants tried to capture Matabian , their 
troops were decimated . We destroyed two whole battalions. 
There was a KKO (Marine Corps) battalion , Battalion VII . In 
their first assault they didn't use air cover; in the second one they 
did. During the first assault, we captured two Indonesian 
soldiers who stayed with us for quite a while. Their names were 
Edi and Firdaus. In 1978, we set them free, and told them we 
aren't fighting the Indonesian people but the military regime. 
By this time in 1978, we were encircled by enemy troops. 
Their tactic was to gain control of the water sources . At first we 
managed to survive, living on plants which we knew had a high 
liquid content. We studied ways of cutting plants to drain as 
much liquid as possible from them. But clearly this couldn't last 
long so I and another fellow decided to go in search of water. We 
went down into the valley , well camouflaged, but soon found 
ourselves near Indonesian troops. We stood there actually 
watching them attack our forces. Then we went on our way , 
looking for water , but as we turned a corner we came face to face 
with an Indonesian soldier. He made a sign to show that he 
would shoot us if we didn't surrender. We had no alternative, 
and then they took us closer to where our forces were and 
ordered us to call on our friends to surrender as well. It's a 
classical tactic and our people have learned not to fall for it. 
I spent the next four months with these enemy troops, treated 
like a slave , carrying their weapons and other equipment. We 
weren't wearing uniform when I was caught so they didn't realise 
we were with the guerrillas . The work they made me do was very 
arduous, so one day I had the idea of borrowing a horse from a 
nearby village. But soon afterwards, an Indonesian took this 
horse and wanted to sell it. I told him I had only borrowed it and 
had to give it back, but he accused me of having stolen it. This 
made me absolutely furious . I hadn't stolen it, I shouted , but 
even if I had, I hadn't stolen it from a Javanese but from one of 
my own people. This made the soldier very angry, and he started 
beating me, and knocked me hard against a rock. I managed to 
escape and fled to the nearby village. Then I managed to get a 
safe-conduct pass from a soldier who had befriended me, so I 
went to Uatocarabau and later to Dili. After some time I 
managed to get a job working as a nurse . In Dili, I was able to 
contact my wife in Lisbon, with the help of the Red Cross. 
While you were a prisoner, what did you see of how Indonesians 
waged war against Fretilin? 
I was kept mostly among the medical staff, always in the 
centre of the encampment, so I never really saw any fighting. I 
did see a lot of wounded men, though, and we were required to 
treat these wounded Indonesians. I could see that there were 
many Timorese badly in need of medical treatment, but we were 
not allowed to treat them at all . Most of these Timorese were old 
people or children who hadn 't been able to flee with the 
community when the Indonesians came. It was so heartless of 
the Indonesians not to allow us to treat them, even though many 
were in a bad state of health . 
From then on, you weren't with the resistance any more, but can 
you tell us something about organisation and tactics from 1980 
onwards? 
Well , up to 1980, guerrilla groups fought many engagements , 
but they were scattered and widely dispersed . Each group had to 
work out its own tactics. But around the time of the Indonesian 
offensive in 1981, the Operasi Keamanan, Fretilin felt the time 
had come to bring their people together and discuss tactics 
thoroughly . A conference was held though it isn't possible for 
me to say what strategy was worked out. We have no support at 
all from outside, but we do have the people's support. For 
instance, people in Dili send information to those in the bush 
and get it back too. This wouldn't be possible wihout the 
people's support. And they S\lpply not only information but 
supplies as well, food, medicine etc. People in the settlements try 
to cultivate plots of land as far from the town as possible because 
this brings them nearer to Fretilin in the bush. The Indonesians 
realise this and try to stop people leaving the settlements . During 
the 1981 enemy operations, the people's support for Fretilin was 
very obvious. Everytime people were involved in enemy attacks, 
Fretilin was informed and held its fire . On the other hand, the 
people knew where Fretilin forces were concentrated and tried 
to send enemy troops in the opposite direction. 
Are people allowed to leave the settlements at all? 
Yes, but not beyond a certain point or they will be accused of 
trying to contact Fretilin. They need a travel pass or a 'surat 
jalan', which must be matched with their idenity card . And they 
have to pay for these documents. When they travel, the 
documents must be stamped at military posts, and bribes have to 
be paid for this. These stamps then show the route you have 
taken, and it's very difficult not to return the same way., The 
pass says where you are allowed to go and it always has a time 
limit. 
The Indonesians claim they are investing a lot of money in East 
Timor and are treating the Timorese very generously. People 
don't have to pay taxes, they say, and get water and electricity 
free, no TV licences, free schooling, free phones, and so on. How 
do the Timorese see this? 
Yes, it's true. People don't pay taxes or electricity bills. As 
for water, the supply is very difficult because of the effects of the 
war. But the point is this: if the Indonesians were to require 
payment for all these things, the people would in any.case refuse 
to pay. In the first place, they don't have the money to pay, and 
secondly, they would regard paying taxes as a form of 
collaboration with the enemy. 
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House of Lords debates 
East Timor 
The following debate, reproduced from Hansard, took place in the House of Lords on 15th November 1983. Lord Glenarthur was 
speaking for the Government. 
East Timor: Military Operations 
3.2 p.m. 
Lord Avebury: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the 
Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. 
The Question was as follows: 
To ask Her Majesty's Government what reports 
they have received about, the build-up of 
Indonesian troops in East Timor since the middle of 
August, and the military operations which have. 
been undertaken there by Indonesia. 
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, firm information is 
hard to come by. But it is clear that the ceasefire in 
East Timor which had been in effect since the 
beginning of the year has come to an end. 
Lord Avebury: My Lords, has not the Foreign 
Secretary said in correspondence with a number of 
people that there was a substantial build-up of 
Indonesian troops in East Timor? Has the noble Lord 
studied reports that the number of such troops may 
amount to between 10,000 and 20,000, and that 
helicopters and planes are being deployed in the attack 
on the people of East Timor which-does the noble 
Lord agree?-was clearly premeditated. Will he bear 
in mind the fact that the International Committee of 
the Red Cross was prevented from operating in the 
territory from July onwards, just before the attack 
took place? 
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords. Indonesia has certainly 
sent extra troops to East Timor; but, as the noble Lord 
himself made clear, estimates of the number vary. It 
seems unlikely that operations have been extensive, 
given the small number of active Fretilin guerrillas 
involved. and we would expect that military 
operations will have to end shortly when the rainy 
season begins. As regards relief organisations, yes I am 
aware, and I am aware that my right honourable friend 
is aware, of the situation concerning the ICRC, but it 
seems that a number of other relief organisations 
continue to operate in East Timor and these include 
the United States Catholic Relief and UNICEF. 
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, in view of this 
unprovoked aggression and virtual annexation of East 
Timor, which I understand the Government have 
condemned , and the appalling violations of human 
rights-again, I understand that over 100,000 people 
in East Timor have been killed-why are the Govern-
ment still selling armaments to Indonesia? Can the 
noble Lord say why the Government failed to support 
the United Nations Resolution supporting self-
determination for East Timor? 
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, the figures to which the 
noble Lord, Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, refers are his 
figures. They are speculative. Of course, we will 
continue to watch the situation closely but no grounds 
exist at present for formal representation . The noble 
Lord may like to know that we are in touch with the 
Indonesian Government and they are fully aware of 
our interest in this matter. As regards arms sales, this 
is a difficult matter. Many factors must be taken into 
account. including the effect of such sales on 
employment in the United Kingdom. As the noble 
Lord knows, all sales require an export licence and 
each application is carefully considered. 
Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos: My Lords, the noble 
Lord referred to my figures as speculative. Does he not 
agree however that serious violations of human rights 
have taken place in East Timor? In those 
circumstances how does he justify the sale of 
armaments by Great Britain to Indonesia, which is 
guilty of these violations? 
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, it would not be 
appropriate to adopt any arms embargo against 
Indonesia. We have excellent relations with Indonesia. 
Furthermore, there is no mandatory United Nations 
arms embargo against Indonesia. 
Lord A vebury: My Lords. is the noble Lord aware 
that the total number of people who have perished in 
East Timor since the occupation by Indonesia in 1975 
is estimated by competent authorities at between 
150,000 and 200,000. Bearing in mind this enormous 
carnage committed by an aggressor nation on this tiny 
territory, does not the noble Lord think that reasons of 
economic self-interest pale into insignificance? Will he 
reflect on the remarks that he has just made to the 
House when next the question of American arms sales 
to Argentina occurs, because surely there is a parallel 
there? In both cases aggression was committed on a 
small and defenceless people; but in one case the 
Government are saying that the Americans should not 
supply arms to the aggressor but are busily supplying 
arms to the aggressor in the other situation. 
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I certainly do not 
intend getting involved in any discussion about 
Argentina which is the subject of another question 
altogether. I have nothing to add to what I said earlier. 
Lord Leatherland: My Lords, would the Minister 
agree that he is probably a little optimistic in 
suggesting that the rainy season will stop these 
operations? Is he further aware that those of us who 
were in the Somme in 1915 were standing up to our 
waists in water for weeks on end and that did not stop 
operations? 
Lord Glenarthur: My Lords, I am interested to hear 
the noble Lord's anecdotes; but I think there is 
evidence to support what I said, that the coming of the 
rainy season should end these operations. 
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Official Report of the Australian Par-
liamentary Delegation to Indonesia, chair-
man W.L. Morrison, MP (September 
1983) 
The Human Rights and Conditions of the 
People of East Timor . Report of the Au-
stralian Senate Inquiry, Chairman Senator 
G.D. Mcintosh (September 1983). 
The intense public debate in Australia this 
year on the question of East Timor came to 
a climax with the publication of two official 
reports which take diametrically opposed 
positions. That the two groups are chaired 
by parliamentarians from the same party, 
the Australian Labour Party, only shows 
that even the party whose programme up-
holds the principle of self-determination 
and its proper application in the case of 
East Timor is in fact represented by many 
people who treat principle with contempt. 
How else can one interpret the remark 
that sets the tone of the Australian Par-
liamentary Oelegation's report, that: 
The Ind~nesians certainly regard the East 
Timor question as a critical test of Austra-
lian-Indonesian relations indicating that if 
differences persist the whole relationship will 
suffer. 
Why strain the relationship, the Report 
argues, because in any case, "Australia's 
position does not count . . . How Australia 
votes in the UN will make no difference to 
the situation in East Tim or. Indonesia . . . 
regards the incorporation of East Timor 
into the Republic of Indonesia as final and 
irreversible." Inspired by such thoughts, 
the delegation h~d no need to go to East 
Tim or. Whatever they saw or heard was 
clearly not going to make any difference, 
unless of course it was an exercise underta-
ken just to give their conclusion greater 
"validity" because they had been there and 
seen things for themselves. 
Their Report, though, should be read 
carefully, in particular the Appendices, to 
get an idea of what the delegation saw but 
did not probe, to appreciate its abysmal 
failure to pursue clear signs that it was 
being conned, of its almost sole reliance on 
the information and explanations of In-
donesian army officers or Indonesian-ap-
pointed Timorese officials. 
"The administration in East Timor ap-
pears to be in effective control of all settled 
areas", claims the Report (p.77), yet when 
the Delegation landed in Same, "police 
guards . . . chased away the would-be in-
terested" and "rushed the Delegation up 
the hill to the Bupati's office at an appa-
rently needless reckless speed" (p.45) . 
What clearer sign could one have that 
people were trying to breach the security 
surrounding the visitors? 
Or, why was the Dilor settlement area 
"uncannily empty when the Delegation ar-
rived" and "the few people to be found, 
mostly old, appeared reserved, if not af-
raid"? Dilor, the Report explains, is a l'e-
settlement area for former inhabitants of 
Lacluta. But, why the move? "Lacluta had 
apparently been the site of some serious 
clashes in the war where casualties had 
been high" (p.46). Is that all they could dis-
cover? If they had met those "uncannily" 
absent inhabitants, they might have heard 
about the Lacluta massacres of September 
1981 when "Indonesian soldiers took hold 
of the legs of small children and . . . 
smashed their heads against a rock" and 
when "twenty trucks were needed to take 
the bodies away" , according to eye witness 
accounts . (See Dossier on East Timor , 
1982, compiled by ACFOA.) But then , the 
last place one would expect to hear such 
accounts would be in East Timor with In-
donesian officials constantly at your side . 
Or, take this exchange during the delega-
tion's conversation with officials in Ainaro: 
Mr Morrison (Chairman of the Delegation) 
. . . stated that he believed that there was 
some Fretilin activity in this area last year. 
What was the scale of those operations? 
There was some debate among the Indone-
sians .. . then the Military Commander re-
plied that he had been in Ainaro for one year 
only and that there had been no action in 
that time. Mr Morrison asked, what about 
reports of trouble last August? Mr Nurdanah 
(senior official of the Indonesian Foreign 
Ministry) intervened at this point to say that 
the trouble was not actually caused by Freti-
lin , but by people who robbed. The Military 
Commander added that he only deals with 
the situation at the moment. He does not 
know about the past (p.180). 
Senator Mcintosh, in his dissenting 
note, describes the official report as "ten-
dentious, superficial and at times mislead-
ing". Yes, it is all of that, but still worse, it 
ignores its own publicly recorded evidence 
that Honourable Parliamentarians were 
taken for a ride, and have the gall to think 
that the rest of us will not see them as cyni-
cal apologists for an aggressive and bar-
baric regime. 
The main recommendations of the Se-
nate Inquiry Report are based on the ir-
refutable fact that Indonesia's occupation 
of East Timor was an illegal act and that 
there must be an internationally recognised 
act of self-determination in East Timor. 
From this follows the logical conclusion 
that Australian recognition of any Indone-
sian claim must be conditional upon the 
people exercising their right to self-deter-
mination . The Report presents evidence to 
show how baseless is the claim made by In-
donesia that the Timorese people have 
freely opted to become Indonesia's 27th 
province. The lack of civil and political 
rights is described in some detail based not 
only on the 1,773 pages of published, writ-
ten and oral evidence that accompanies the 
Report but also on the many testimonies 
heard by the Inquiry in camera from East 
Timorese refugees who feared for the 
safety of relatives at home and chose totes-
tify in secret. 
It is difficult thou~ to accept the In-
quiry's belief that "the worst abuses have 
been moderated as the internal situation 
has stabilised" (p.37). This is hardly tena-
ble in view of the fact that hundreds of 
thousands of Timorese are now forced to 
live in "resettlement areas" in order to suit 
Indonesia's counter-insurgency strategy, 
and that many thousands of people are in 
detention in Atauro and elsewhere. There 
is nothing moderate about a system of rep-
ression if mass murders on the scale that 
occurred most recently in 1981 temporarily 
cease. Indeed, even as the Report ap-
peared in print , new savagery was being 
wrought on the people of East Timor -
villages burnt down , villagers shot to death 
and prisoners removed to goodness knows 
where. 
The Report devotes much space to In-
donesia's "development" plans and even 
states that the government is "making a 
concerted effort to develop and increase 
agricultural productivity". It gives cre-
dence to the idea that the resettlement 
centres "provide people with relief and de-
velopment services" . Yet detailed tes-
timonmy was submitted (pp.715-738), 
based on quotations from a variety of 
sources, showing that the forced resettle-
ment of hundreds of thousands of 
Timorese "drastically disrupted the fragile 
subsistence economy on which most 
Timorese depended" (p.736) . Resettle-
ment is indeed the backbone of Indonesia's 
strategy in East Timor, and to mention it in 
the same breath as "relief" and "develop-
ment services" only helps to justify that 
strategy. 
The inadequacy of the Senate Inquiry 
findings on the nature of Indonesia's 
economic and social policies in East Timor 
points to the need for a thorough-going 
analysis of the "development" now taking 
place in East Timor. 
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Internal repression 
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November 1983. He is accused of "spreading hatred" for 
publicly condemning government persecution of Muslims at 
a halal bi/ halal celebration which turned into a protest 
against the ban on Muslim schoolgirls wearing headscarves 
at school. 
(Below) The meeting at the Al-Azhar mosque, attended by 
30,000 people. 
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